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 A new method of sink location security in a Wireless Sensor Network is 
proposed. In the proposed scheme, all the node addresses are encrypted and 
an attacker cannot determine the real sink address by capturing the packets 
and analyzing its contents for the final destination. The main contribution of 
our proposed method is to use random routing scheme with misleading dead 
ends. This provides security against traffic analysis attack. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
A sink is a critical node in a Wireless Sensor Network, as it collects all the data from the sensors and 
acts as a gate way to the Internet and other networks. Thus we should provide the highest degree of 
anonymity and security to the sink [1] from the adversaries.  The main techniques adopted by the adversaries 
are traffic analysis attack and packet tracing attack.  In this work we propose a comprehensive protection 
against these two attacks. Traffic analysis and packet tracing attacks are basically passive attacks by 
adversaries where they listen to the traffic flow and then deduce the direction towards the sink. Here the 
adversary uses packet tracing technique to reach the sink. To counter this attack we propose the Random 
Routing Scheme with Misleading Dead Ends (RRSMDE).Several works have been presented to provide sink 
location security using random routing and other methods [2-5]. In [1], the authors use fake sinks away from 
the real sink to misguide the packet tracing attacker. But the number of fake sinks and their locations are 
fixed priori and the attacker can identify these fake sinks after certain trials. In Zone based Sink Location 
Privacy Routing Protocol [2], the authors have used zone partitioning of the WSN and fake sinks and a real 
sink are located in each zone. A source node of a zone transmits packets to its own fake sinks as well as its 
real sink. In this case also, the number of fake sinks per zone is limited and their locations are  
pre-determined. Once the zones are identified by the attacker, further detection of false sinks and the real sink 
are easy for the adversary.  
In [1] and [2], the fake packet injections do not occur at every hop, but occurs at specified 
intersection nodes. On the contrary, in our proposed method, there is no limit on the fake destinations.  
For each transmission, the fake destinations will be different. We also provide fake branching at every 
successive main path nodes so that the random dispersion is very high. In our proposed scheme, packet data 
security is achieved by encrypting the entire content of the data packet using pairwise secret keys. 
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In [3], backbone flooding is adopted apart from virtual (fake) sinks. In our scheme, sink location security is 
achieved without backbone flooding resulting in lesser overhead. Randomized Routing with Hidden Address 
is used by Ngai in [5]. He uses random routing paths all of which start from the source. This will endanger 
the source location security when traffic analysis and packet tracing attacks are mounted. Another drawback 
of Ngai’s method is the use of encrypted data packets instead of fake packets. In our method, random 
branching occurs at every node along the main path which provides better security for the source which is a 
secondary advantage. Also, the use of fake packets for the fake routes will increase the security of real data. 
In [6], Shu, et al., have described Randomized Multipath Delivery to achieve sink location security.  
The basic principle of Shu’s method is the secret sharing of information based on the well known Shamir’s 
algorithm [7] with multipath routing. This information splitting and its subsequent recovery necessitate 
additional overhead. In our scheme, information splitting is avoided to reduce the computational overhead. 
Location Privacy Routing (LPR) in [8] uses close and farther neighbor lists to manage real and fake packets. 
This involves detailed location information of all the neighbors as a pre-requisite. Hence, the LPR scheme is 
computationally expensive. In our scheme, the exact location information of neighbors is not required.  
Our proposed sink location privacy scheme overcomes several disadvantages of the existing 
methods. Our scheme uses non-repetitive random path transmissions with misleading dead ends.  
The description of the scheme is given in the next section. A ready to use algorithm, RRSMDE is presented 
in Section 2. The simulated comparative study shows that our method performs better than other methods as 
demonstrated in Section 3. 
 
 
2. BASIC SCHEME AND WORKING 
RRSMDE is basically a randomized multicast routing. Fake copies of the original data packet are 
transmitted to reach different random dummy destinations while one true copy reaches the actual final 
destination which is normally the sink. To make matter clear, an instance of the multi-paths of RRSMDE is 
shown in Figure 1. The shortest path from the source to the sink is called the main path. In Figure 1, the path 
list [V1, V2, V3, V4, V5] gives the main path which is shown in the black bold font. Here V1 is the source 
and V5 is the sink node. In this paper, symbol Vj represents both the node name (identity) and the encrypted 
node address of node j where j ∈ {1 to N}.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.   RRMSDE multicast paths 
 
 
The nodes along the main path are called the main path nodes. In our scheme, branching towards the 
random fake destinations takes place at successive main path nodes including the final destination node.  
In Figure 1, multicast branching occurs along the main path at nodes V1, V2, V3, V4, and V5. Sub branches 
are shown in blue. In our scheme, at present, only one sub branch originates at each branch point.  
The number of branch points is equal to the number of nodes along the main path. The number of sub 
branches in Figure 1 is 5. In Figure 1, the lengths of the sub branches are all chosen randomly. The original 
packet is sent along the main path and this packet is called the main packet. The main packet header 
information is updated at each main path node as it travels along the main path and ultimately reaches the 
final destination.  At each branch point, an altered copy of the main packet, called the fake packet, is created 
and it is sent along the sub branch for its travel further. The update operation of the main packet and the 
creation of fake packets are described later.  In RRSMDE, the sink (the final real destination) is not one of 
the dead ends. A branch path starts from the sink and continues further. This is to confuse the 
attacker further.  
 
 
U24 
U23 
U22 
U21 
V1 
src 
V4 
V3 
V2 
V5 
sink 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng, Vol. 9, No. 5, October 2019 :  4176 - 4183 
4178 
2.1. Packet header information for the main path 
The address information stored in the encrypted form in the main packet header is shown in Table 1. 
In general, the Main Packet at start is called MP1 and that at kth main node is called MPk, for k = 1 to L where 
L is the total number of nodes in the Main Path. The kth node transmits MPk to the (k+1)th node.   
 
 
Table 1.  Header fields in the main packet MP1 at source V1 
Present Source Address Next Destination  Address Node count k Main Path List Others 
Initially V1 V2 1 [ V1, V2, …, VL] -------- 
 
 
The second row gives the corresponding terms from the Example of Figure 1. The header content of 
the main packet, travelling from the original source to the final destination, changes as the packet goes from 
the present node to the next node. In general, the Main Packet at start is called MP1 and that at kth main node 
is called MPk, for k = 1 to L where L is the total number of nodes in the Main Path. The kth node transmits 
MPk to the (k+1)th node. When the main packet reaches V2, The present address is updated to V2 and the next 
destination address is updated from the Main Path List and k is incremented by 1. In general, when the main 
packet arrives at the kth node of the main path the values of the address fields and k value before and after 
updating would be as shown in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2.  Header fields of the packet at kth main path node 
Present Source Address Next Destination Address Node count k Main Path List Others 
Before update 
Vk−1 Vk k−1 [V1,V2, ,,…, VL] ------ 
After update 
Vk Vk+1 k [V1,V2, ,,…, VL] ------ 
 
 
The values of Table 2 hold true for  k = 2, 3,…, L−1. Note that the Lth node is the sink and no 
further update and forwarding at the sink, because the main path routing is over. When the main packet 
arrives at the sink, it checks that k=L and also the present source address field value Vk=L. In our scheme, the 
main packet contains the address of the next destination. Thus we use source routing to send  
the main data. 
 
2.2. Sub branch paths and packets 
A sub branch originates from every main path node. The sub branch path starting from Vk is called 
SBk for k=1 to L.  In Figure 1, SB2 = [U21, U22, U23, U24]. The nodes along the sub branch paths are random. 
The present source node, in a sub branch path, selects the next hop destination randomly among its neighbors 
excluding the main path nodes and the nodes which have been already traversed so far. When there are no 
neighbors for a sub branch node, the transmission automatically gets terminated even if TTL has not yet 
reached zero. The sub branch packet which is a fake packet contains the Time To Live (TTL) which 
determines the length of the sub branch path. After each sub branch hop, TTL gets decremented by 1. When 
the TTL reaches zero, the propagation is terminated. 
 
2.3. Algorithm for the main path propogation 
The working of the main path propagation of RRSMDE is represented by the term RRSMDE-MPP 
and the algorithm RRSMDE-MPP is described as follows. 
 
Algorithm RRSMDE- MPP.  Inputs: The shortest path [V1, V2,…,Vk,…, VL].       
- Set k =1.       //Start at V1.  
- Create the main path packet MPk,  
- Create the fake packet and choose its TTL 
- Start sub branch propagation starting from this main path node Vk. 
- Send the main packet to the next main path node Vk+1 
- Receive the packet at Vk+1. Update the Present Source Address and the Next Destination Address fields   
   of the main packet 
- Increment k as, k = k+1.  //Main packet is fully updated 
- If k = L   go to 9. // Final destination is reached 
   Else go to 3. 
- Start the sub branch propagation starting from this main path node VL.  
- Over. 
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2.4. Sub branch propagation 
Sub Branch Propagation (SBP) is a random path travel with fake data packets. The purpose is to 
confuse the attacker who may follow the packets to discover the destination (sink or BS). In our scheme, one 
sub branch propagation starts from each main path including the final destination. There are L separate sub 
branch paths where L is the number of nodes along the main path. The nodes along a sub branch random path 
are so selected that the nodes do not repeat (which means no loops) and the path excludes the nodes of the 
main path which provides better security by drawing the attention away from the main path. When the sub 
branch path ends, the fake packet is discarded. 
 
2.5. RRSMDE example  
The WSN layout is shown in Figure 2. A grid based deployment is used with a few missing nodes at 
random grid points. Here 82 nodes are distributed in a 10x10 grid. Each grid cell is 100mx100m.  
The communication range of each node is set to 150 meters. A node can have a maximum of 8 neighbors 
along north, south, east, west, north-east, south-east, north-west, south-west. In this example, source node  
is 11 and the final main destination (sink) is node 56. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Main path and sub branch paths for example 1. Src=11 and sink=56 
 
 
The shortest (main) path is: [11, 12, 21, 29, 37, 38, 39, 48, 56]. The length of the shortest  
path SPL=8. The total number of nodes of the main path=L=9. There are 9 sub branches. The sub branch 
paths for one trial are shown in Figure 2. The sub branch path SB3, starting from node 21 does not exist 
because it has no valid neighbors. For the same WSN layout of of Figure 2, the formation of paths when  
src=9 and sink=59 is shown in Figure 3. From Figures 2 and 3, we can see the possible patterns of RRSNDE. 
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Figure 3. Main path and sub branch paths for example 1. Src=9 and sink =59 
 
 
3. SIMULATION, RESULTS AND RELATIVE PERFORMANCE 
3.1. Average path length (APL) 
APL is measured in terms of the average number of hops required to reach the destination from the 
source. The packet delivery time mainly depends on the APL. Smaller the APL, better is the performance. 
In RRSMDE, the true packets follow the shortest (main) path from the source to the destination. Therefore 
the APL is same as the Shortest Path Length (SPL). Both are expressed in terms of the number of hops. 
Therefore, 
 
APL(RRSMDE)=SPL                                                         (1)      
 
In Purely Random Propagation (PRP) [6] and Location Privacy Routing (LPR) [8], the routes are 
randomized. In PRP, the APL is given by, 
 
APL(PRP) = average(TTL)+SPL                                               (2) 
 
Here, TTL is the length of the random part of the path in each trial. In LPR, the average length of the routing 
path is given by [8], 
 
APL(LPR) = {1/(1−2*Pf)}*SPL                                              (3)    
 
Here, Pf is the probability of selecting the next node further away from the destination. 
Taking the WSN as given in the Example of Section 2.4,  the APLs are calculated for different SPL 
values and for different methods. In calculating APL(PRP), average(TTL) is obtained by taking 100 trials 
with TTL(max) set to 8. In calculating APL(LPR), Pf is taken as 0.2. The variation of APL which represents 
the packet delivery time is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Average path length vs shortest path length 
 
 
3.2. Overall Energy Consumption (OEC)  
The Overall Energy Consumption (OEC) for a given trial (to send a data packet from src to dst) 
depends on the total length of the paths generated ( both main and sub branch paths) or the Total Number of 
Hops (TNH). The TNH values for algorithms RRSMDE, PRP and LPR are given by, 
 
TNH(RRSMDE) = SPL + sum of the sub branch path lengths                          (4) 
 
TNH(PRP) = SPL+ average(TTL)                                                      (5) 
 
TNH(LPR)  = {1/(1−2*Pf)}*SPL                                                       (6) 
 
In PRP and LPR methods, in each, there is only one path per trial.   
Variation of TNH with SPL is shown in Figure 5. In the case of RRSMDE, the TNH value is very 
large because of multiple fake paths. Therefore the energy consumption is more, compared to the other  
two methods. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Total number of paths (TNH) vs shortest path 
 
 
3.3. Strength of receiver anonymity protection  
In evaluating the strength of the receiver anonymity, we use the adversary model as in [8]. One of the 
measures to represent the strength of receiver anonymity is Adversary’s Attack Time (AAT) which is 
“measured as the number of moving steps (from one sensor location to a neighbor) the adversary has to make 
before he reaches the receiver”. In RRSMDE, the adversary has to traverse each sub branch twice, once to go 
forward (miss the real receiver) and then to retreat. Therefore the number of steps the adversary has to traverse 
before reaching the final destination is given by, 
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AAT(RRSMDE) = SPL + 2*sum of the sub branch path lengths                            (7)  
 
In PRP and LPR, AAT is same as the Average Path Length, APL, as given by (2) and (3). Variation 
of AAT with SPL is shown in Figure 6. The results are obtained by analytical calculations. In the case of 
RRSMDE, the AAT value is very large because of multiple fake paths. Therefore the strength of anonymity is 
very high, compared to the other two methods. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Adversary’s attack time (AAT) vs shortest path length 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
A new method of random routing scheme with misleading dead ends is presented. The packet 
tracing attacker will be utterly confused because of multiple random paths which lead to wrong dead ends. 
From the relative performance plots, it can be seen that RRSMDE is much better than other methods. 
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